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Abstract
There always exists a monetary equilibrium when search is directed, money is indivisible and
production is on demand (Julien Kennes King 2007). We demonstrate that when production
takes place before exchange, forcing sellers to incur a sunk cost, there must be a minimum
buyer-seller ratio for the monetary equilibrium to survive.
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A standard assumption in the monetary search literature is that the amount of goods
traded is produced on demand by sellers contingent on meeting an appropriate buyer.
If there is no such meeting, sellers carry on to the next period with no production
cost. The assumption of production on demand, interpreted as the good being a service,
was made initially in the second generation of monetary search models (Shi 1995, Trejos
Wright, 1995) to suit the pairwise random matching-Nash bargaining framework in which
those models were developed (see Kiyotaki Wright 1989,1991,1993). In those models of
indivisible money, if we assume production prior to meeting, the environment becomes
one of random matching and price posting (1 unit of money against q units of goods)
and the monetary equilibrium unravels: sellers are aware that the arrival rate of buyers
is independent of the quantity they produce, and so they produce a quantity such that
buyers get no gains from trade￿ the value of money falls to zero (Curtis and Wright 2004).
This is a variant of the Diamond (1971) paradox.
Departing from random search, recent developments in the money search literature
make the production on demand assumption no longer necessary. Especially, models in
which search is directed by posted terms of trade (Rocheteau and Wright 2005, Julien
Kennes and King 2007) imply commitment on the side of sellers that could perfectly
accommodate ex-ante production. Still these models assume production on demand. In
this note we extend Julien Kennes and King (2007)￿ s directed search model of indivisible
money by considering production prior to trading rather than production on demand.
First, Julien Kennes and King (2007) has shown that there always exists a monetary
equilibrium with directed search when production is on demand. We want to know is
this result holds when sellers produce prior to meeting. Second, production in advance
suits the goods market better, which makes it an interesting variation to explore. Our
conclusion is that by forcing sellers to incur a sunk cost, ex ante production requires a
minimum buyer-seller ratio for the monetary equilibrium to exist.
2 The Model
There is a [0;1] continuum of in￿nitely lived agents, a fraction M 2 (0;1) of which are
given money and act as buyers. The remaining part act as sellers, implying a buyer-
seller ratio ￿ = M=1 ￿ M. Goods are divisible, money is indivisible, and agents reverse
roles upon successful trades as in the Shi-Trejos-Wright model. Sellers produce and
post quantities to attract buyers and taking into account competition from other sellers.
Buyers observe all advertisements and allocate themselves across sellers. A seller can only
serve one buyer at a time so if more than one buyer selects a seller, one is picked at random
2to trade. The produced quantity is then traded in all matches. For simplicity we assume
that any unsold quantity (no match for a seller) entirely depreciates. In any period and
for any agent, consuming q units of his consumption good yields u(q) and producing q
costs c(q) with standard concavity and convexity assumptions. In equilibrium buyers will
be indi⁄erent between all sellers and will allocate themselves randomly. We note ￿ < 1
the discount factor.
We solve ￿rst for the equilibrium posted q in a particular period, and then solve for
steady state. Let ￿ V0 be the value for a seller and ￿ V1 be the value for a buyer. These
values embed the equilibrium quantity, qe, simultaneously produced and posted by sellers
in each period. Let q be the quantity chosen and produced by one seller while all other
sellers set Q and let ￿(q) (not necessarily equal to ￿), be the corresponding expected
queue length for this seller. The value to a seller of posting q is:
V0 (q) = ￿c(q) + ￿(q)￿ ￿ V1 + [1 ￿ ￿(q)]￿ ￿ V0 (1)
where ￿(q) = 1 ￿ e￿￿(q) is the probability of attracting at least one buyer when posting
q.1 The value for a buyer selecting a seller producing q is
V1(q) =  (q)
￿
u(q) + ￿ ￿ V0)
￿
+ [1 ￿  (q)]￿ ￿ V1; (2)
where  (q) = 1￿e￿￿(q)
￿(q) is the probability a buyer gets served when selecting a seller posting
q.
Let ￿ = ￿ V1 ￿ ￿ V0. For a buyer to be willing to trade within a match it requires
u(q) + ￿ ￿ V0 ￿ ￿ ￿ V1, or
u(q) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0: (3)
For a seller to be willing to trade at a given posted q, since production costs are sunk,
it only requires ￿ V1 > ￿ V0 which has to be true (and actually is as shown below) since his
only chance to cover that cost is to sell his production. The relevant incentive constraint
for a seller is then whether to take part into this economy or not, that is V0 (q) ￿ 0: From
(1) this is equivalent to
￿ V0 (1 ￿ ￿) = ￿(q)￿￿ ￿ c(q) ￿ 0: (4)
By comparison, in Julien Kennes and King (2007), the incentive constraint for the seller
is ￿￿￿c(q) ￿ 0: Here production costs are sunk whereas trade is contingent on attracting
at least one buyer, which happens with probability ￿(q):
1A derivation of the matching probabilities for sellers and buyers is generated by the symmetric
equilibrium mixed strategies. As shown in Julien, Kennes and King (2007), these generate an urn-ball
(exponential) matching function.
3The ￿rst participating constraints (3) implies a minimum q that a buyer is willing to
accept de￿ned by u(q) = ￿￿. The second implies a maximum ￿ q that a seller is willing to
o⁄er de￿ned by c(￿ q) = ￿(￿ q)￿￿. When deciding which quantity to produce and advertise,
a seller solves the following problem
max
q2[q;￿ q]
V0(q) s.t. V1(q) = ￿ V1 (5)
where the constraint determines how the expected queue length ￿(q) changes with the
posted q. The expected queue length is determined by buyers being indi⁄erent between
selecting the seller producing q or any other seller in the market producing Q like all
others. In large markets, the value of selecting the seller posting q must be equal to
the buyer￿ s equilibrium market utility value ￿ V1.2 It follows that, for any q ￿ q, we have
V1(q) ￿ ￿ V1 or ￿(q) = 0: no buyer would select a seller producing q < q even if he were to
be served with probability 1. Similarly, for any q ￿ ￿ q, we have V1(q) ￿ ￿ V1 or ￿(q) = 1:
all buyers select the seller, but the seller is not willing to produce q > ￿ q.







Di⁄erentiating and using the implicit function theorem on V1(q) = ￿ V1 gives
 






[1 ￿ e￿￿(q) ￿ ￿(q)e￿￿(q)][u(q) ￿ ￿￿]
: (7)
It is easy to show that V0(q) is concave in q and ￿
0(q) > 0. Using (7) in (6), and
setting (6) equal to zero yields the equilibrium production q in a given period taking the










Let q = q(￿) be the solution to (8). The solution is a seller￿ s best response to the
expected aggregate variable ￿. In order to solve for ￿ = ￿ V1 ￿ ￿ V0; let qe be the quantity
posted by sellers in any period. We have
￿ V0 = ￿c(q
e) + ￿(￿)￿￿ + ￿ ￿ V0 (9)
2To solve for equilibrium q we use the market utility property which is known to yield equivalent
solutions to considering a subgame perfect equilibrium in large markets. See Peters (2000).
4and
￿ V1 =  (￿)[u(q
e) ￿ ￿￿] + ￿ ￿ V1: (10)
Notice that ￿ V0 and ￿ V1 are functions of qe. The matching probabilities are expressed as
￿(￿) = 1 ￿ e￿￿ and  (￿) = 1￿e￿￿
￿ to re￿ ect the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium,
buyers select all sellers with the same probability. Hence, q = Q = qe, and ￿(q) = ￿ =
M
1￿M. Using (9) and (10) along with ￿ gives
￿(q
e) = ￿ V1(q
e) ￿ ￿ V0(q
e) =
 (￿)u(qe) + c(qe)
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿  (￿) ￿ ￿(￿)))
> 0 () q
e > 0: (11)
The relationship ￿ = ￿(qe) is an aggregate consistency requirement, determining the
value of ￿ when all sellers are producing and trading qe for a unit of ￿at money (Shi
2006). A ￿xed point of qe = qe(￿) and ￿ = ￿(qe) gives the steady state equilibrium.
To show existence, insert ￿ = ￿ V1 ￿ ￿ V0 into (8) and note that the LHS of (8) is















where we have used the fact that c(￿ q) = ￿(￿ q)￿￿(￿ q): From (12) and (13) a su¢ cient
condition for existence is then given by
u(￿ q)c
0(￿ q) ￿ c(￿ q)
￿
u





It is easy to see that this inequality is satis￿ed for large ￿: Especially when ￿ ! 1+
it simpli￿es into u(￿ q) ￿ c(￿ q) which is always true.3 Conversely, from (14) again, we can
derive two su¢ cient conditions for non existence of a monetary equilibrium
(i) : u
0(￿ q)g(￿ q)c(￿ q) ￿ u(￿ q)c
0(￿ q)
(ii) : c(￿ q) ￿ u(￿ q)￿(￿ q)
both of which are veri￿ed for low ￿: Therefore
3Another way to see this is to notice that when ￿ ! 1+ (4) transforms into ￿￿￿c(q) ￿ 0; which is
the seller￿ s participation constraint in Julien Kennes and King (2007). Whether production takes place
before or after meeting does not matter if a seller is certain to meet a buyer.
5Proposition 1 When production costs are sunk, there must be a minimum buyer-seller
ratio in a directed search economy for a monetary equilibrium to exist.
When production takes place before exchange, forcing sellers to incur a sunk cost,
sellers have to expect a positive return to cover that cost. In random matching models
this is achieved, for instance, by increasing the share sellers receive in the equilibrium of
the bargaining game. In directed search, this is achieved by raising the buyer-seller ratio.
3 Conclusion
The assumption that production is on demand proved helpful in developing monetary
search models. Especially, no monetary equilibrium is sustainable with production in
advance and random matching. In this note, we have shown that a monetary equilibrium
exists with production in advance and directed search, but this requires to raise the
seller￿ s expected return via a minimum buyer-seller ratio.
When search is directed but money is fully divisible, as in Rocheteau and Wright
(2005), there again exists a monetary equilibrium for all buyer-seller ratios when pro-
duction is on demand. It is not clear, however, that our result would hold in their
environment as there are now two margins of adjustment operating ex-ante. As the
buyer-seller ratio falls, sellers can respond by increasing the posted price or decreasing
the posted quantity. We leave this question open for future research.
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